War and Law: Why Biden Is Talking About Defensive Weapons

STEFANO RIZZO
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Versione Italiana – Translation by Paul Rosenberg

With the Ukrainian offensive on Russian territory still underway, there is once again much talk of defensive weapons and offensive weapons. This is not a question of splitting hairs to be dismissed with resounding calls for the unfettered use of all the force necessary to obtain the desired results which – let us not forget – are the liberation of Ukrainian territory and the recognition of Ukraine’s full sovereignty. Noble and just intentions, but as always, in international politics it is a question of evaluating the adequacy of the means available to achieving the desired objectives.

From the very beginning of the war, that is, from the start of the Russian invasion, the United States has moved with determination in indicating the objectives but with moderation in the choice of means to employ. Initially, when it was thought that the Russian “special military operation” would quickly succeed, the Ukrainians were to be supplied with light weapons (rifles, mortars, pistols) to organize the resistance against the new regime that would be established.

But then, after the unexpected successes of the Ukrainian soldiers, who managed to stop the advance of the Russian tank column with Javelin shoulder-launched rocket launchers and force them to retreat, the military experts in the American administration began to think that a Russian defeat was possible after all. The American (and to a lesser extent European) side began to supply a cornucopia of increasingly complex, sophisticated and lethal weapons, as well as cooperation between American and Ukrainian intelligence to indicate the targets to hit. This allowed the liberation of vast territories in the north-east of the country in the fall of 2022, giving hope that the further supply of weapons – incessantly requested by President Zelensky – would lead to a final victory.

F-16 Fighting Falcon

However, throughout this period the United States has always maintained a distinction between defensive and offensive weapons: the goal was to liberate Ukrainian soil, not to invade or defeat Russia on its own. Even when it began to supply means that could hardly be considered defensive, such as Abrams tanks or HIMARS missile systems, the United States limited their use within Ukrainian territory, and the same limitation was placed on the use of F16 fighters that, after much hesitation, the United States began to deliver to the Ukrainian air force. When the Ukrainians did not respect these constraints or forced their hand with covert operations, the United States made its displeasure known and reiterated that any armament was supplied for defensive purposes only.

What is the reason for this apparently specious stance by the American government? The Ukrainians are certainly not wrong in arguing that if you want to defend yourself from an aggressor you have to strike its sources: ammunition depots, military airports, logistics centers in Russia. The fear, it has been said, is the spread of the conflict. Thus not provoking Russia by striking targets on its territory so that it is not induced to respond with even more ferocious attacks by striking NATO allies on the border with Ukraine, especially Poland and the Baltic countries. The other side of the argument is that this fear is unfounded, because if Russia were to attack a NATO country, according to Article 5 of the Treaty all member states would be obliged to intervene in its defense. Since Russia knows this well and also knows that it has much more to lose than to gain from such a possibility, it will be careful not to attack a NATO country, because if it did the conflict could quickly slide from a conventional one into a devastating nuclear war.

But there is another reason that explains America’s caution and its incremental action in support of Ukraine while trying to avoid reaching a catastrophic breaking point of no return. The reason lies in international law and more specifically in the law of war. The so-called Law of War is divided into two parts, according to the ancient classification of the Dutch jurist Grotius: the right to wage war (jus ad bellum) and the law in waging war (jus in bello). The second part is the one that was codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (updated in 1977) and concerns the treatment of prisoners of war, the protection of civilians, the prohibition of hitting non-military targets such as schools and hospitals, etc. These are all written and proclaimed rules, but states have continued to violate them in their wars even recently, and of course, in the current wars in Ukraine and Gaza.

An M1 Abrams.

But this is not what worries the United States, which has been responsible for serious violations of jus in bello in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. What worries and partly explains the reticence in sending offensive weapons to the Ukrainians is the first part, the jus ad bellum. This is substantially codified in various conventions signed in The Hague in 1907 and concern the declaration of war (III Convention), the declaration of neutrality or belligerence, and the prohibitions and obligations of the combatants and neutrals (V Convention). Naturally at the time there was no prohibition, today enshrined in the United Nations Charter, on waging war except for defensive purposes and therefore the Hague conventions make no distinction between aggressor and the attacked, between a just war and an unjust war, leaving the judgment on their actions to sovereign states (and possibly future historians).

The conventions establish the principle that a war must be declared, because it is this – the fact that it is an act of force by a state – that makes it “legitimate”, that is, different from an act of piracy. In truth, since the Second World War very few wars have been declared, but the movement of troops beyond one’s borders in itself constitutes a declaration of war and legitimizes a defensive response. But, even more importantly, the conventions oblige all states, bordering or not, to declare if they are belligerents, and on which side, or if they are neutral. In the first case, they enter fully into the conflict. In the second, the status of neutrality gives them rights and duties that they and the belligerents must respect.

A neutral state cannot be invaded or attacked, a naval blockade cannot be imposed on it, nor can its civilian or military ships be hit. At the same time, the neutral state has the obligation not to help one or the other combatants in the war effort: it cannot provide armaments, send volunteers, allow the passage or stationing of belligerent troops on its territory. It must essentially stand by and watch what happens, allowing the strongest to prevail, that is (according to the Klausewitzian scheme) the one with the greatest military and economic resources and the will to prevail. The conventions essentially establish that either one is belligerent or one is neutral, tertium non datur.

There is a strict logic behind this legal classification, which is not abstract at all. It is the awareness that wars have always existed and will probably always exist. But wars must also end, either with the victory of one of the parties or with a negotiation. In the absence of a superior authority that can certify the validity of the reasons of the combatants and is able to intervene to stop the war (the United Nations could in principle do this through the Security Council, but this is almost always blocked by the mutual vetoes of its permanent members), it is inevitable that the war will be resolved in a clash of material and human resources, as well as the will of the two (or more) combatants, and will last until the resources of one or the other are exhausted.

M1 Abrams

And yet if one of the combatants can rely on resources that are not its own, whether military or economic, it is clear that the war will tend to last indefinitely. Its allies – who are not technically allies, because they are formally non-belligerents – can supply it with what it needs to continue fighting, and its leadership will continue to fight as long as it has assurances that the support from abroad will continue. Of course there is the civilian population, and at this point the war becomes increasingly cruel for them, since the only way for the more powerful aggressor to prevail is to undermine the population’s will to resist with continuous attacks and destruction. After that there are only two possibilities: either the war ends (either with a negotiation or with the victory of one of the combatants) or the armed forces of the “allies” enter the field, who at this point become fully-fledged belligerents. And the war continues and expands.

During these over two and a half years of conflict in Ukraine, the United States and its European allies have repeatedly “violated” the principle of neutrality established by the Hague Conventions by not respecting the obligations that they impose on non-belligerents. They have done so gradually and, if you like, cautiously, moving first one pawn and then the other to see the adversary’s reactions. And yet by doing so, they have in fact contributed to the prolongation of a war that should have been resolved long ago, with an outcome based on the balance of power of the belligerents – certainly not satisfactory and certainly unjust – but what war leads to just outcomes?

With the Ukrainian army’s attack on Russian soil we have reached another breaking point: the “aid” provided to Ukraine can hardly be passed off as defensive aid and therefore Russia’s possible reaction becomes increasingly dangerous and unpredictable.

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War and Law: Why Biden Is Talking About Defensive Weapons ultima modifica: 2024-09-02T01:00:42+02:00 da STEFANO RIZZO
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