Israel. The Curse of the Nuclear Weapon

ENRICO CARONE
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Not even the abyss of Gaza’s destruction has managed to break down the wall of silence, omertà, and willful underestimation that for more than half a century has concealed the political, military, and social reality represented by the State of Israel’s possession of a large nuclear arsenal.

We will examine how and when this arsenal was assembled, who enabled it, who helped build it, who supplied the uranium, the plutonium, and the enrichment technologies, under what conditions nuclear tests were conducted, how the effort to equip the arsenal with delivery systems developed, and what military doctrine governs its use.

There is no doubt that the origins of the project to arm Israel with nuclear weapons trace back to the political vision of Ben Gurion — the leader of Zionism, of socialist and Marxist orientation. A military commander of the Yishuv, he unified the main Jewish defense forces in May 1948, merging the Haganah with the terrorist paramilitary organizations, the Irgun and the Lehi, to found the Tsahal (Israel Defense Forces).

The use of nuclear weapons against Japan, ordered by Democratic U.S. President Harry Truman, had been experienced by the team of European Jewish physicists, chemists, and engineers — mostly German, Hungarian, and Italian — as a kind of betrayal. The general expectation among that group of scientists was that the horror they had helped create was justified by the vital necessity of getting ahead of and stopping Hitler’s Germany. Very few of them approved of the use of the atomic bomb on the defenseless civilian populations of two Japanese cities. Among those who did approve of the criminal U.S. decision and distinguished themselves for their bellicosity were Teller and von Neumann.

Two figures stood alongside Ben Gurion from the very beginning of Israel’s nuclear venture: Chaim Weizmann, an accomplished Russian chemist and political leader of the “liberal” Zionist faction, who would become the first President of the State of Israel; and Ernst David Bergmann, also a chemist, born and educated in Germany at the University of Berlin. Bergmann would be appointed director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).

In 1949, secret nuclear capabilities were entrusted to a unit of the IDF called Hemed Gimmel. Under cover of a petroleum research company, they began prospecting for uranium in the Negev desert. Nothing significant was found there, though uranium phosphate compounds were discovered near Beersheba.

There are no notable physicists in the original Israeli nuclear staff on record. The great Jewish physicists were all deeply tied to the American nuclear project, and the other major school of physics that might theoretically have contributed to Israeli research — the Russian school — was fully engaged in the USSR’s own nuclear weapons program, which Stalin had entrusted to the organizational genius of Lavrentiy Beria.

Israel’s program was shrouded entirely in secrecy, as noted. That secrecy would oblige Israel to fund the enormous costs of its nuclear weapons program through private donations, with none of the income or expenses appearing in the state budget (A. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998). American financing was not lacking. In New York, the so-called “Committee of Thirty” was secretly established by the oil magnate and Zionist activist Rudolf Sonneborn, drawing contributions from giants of American finance.

By 1952, Israeli technicians had already achieved significant technical and scientific results, particularly in extracting uranium from phosphate and in heavy water production technology. It was precisely through the sale of these technologies to the French Atomic Energy Agency that a technical and financial collaboration between the two states developed — one that would prove decisive in achieving Israel’s objective (B. Pinkus, M. Tlamim, Atomic Power to Israel’s Rescue: French-Israeli Nuclear Cooperation 1949–1957, Israel Studies, 2002).

Image of the Dimona nuclear facility in Israel

Israeli technicians were invited to collaborate on the construction of the Marcoule facility for producing G-1 plutonium. In parallel, a broader collaboration developed between the France of Mendès-France and the Israel of Shimon Peres, which also included Mossad intelligence and information services that wwere provided to the French state in North African countries undergoing decolonization (W.D. Farr, The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons, Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 2006).

The Franco-Israeli nuclear agreement was signed in strict secrecy in Paris on October 3, 1957. Through this agreement, France managed to circumvent the U.S. embargo on nuclear technology, while Israel obtained — among other things — the benefit of being able to rely on French nuclear testing activities. Gerboise Bleue in 1960 was the first of 17 nuclear tests France conducted in the Sahara desert (4 atmospheric and 13 underground).

Construction of the Israeli underground site at Dimona, in the Negev desert, began in 1958, contracted to a French firm. The project was placed under the leadership of Colonel Manes Pratt, a trusted associate of Peres, while Benjamin Blumberg was appointed to head the intelligence specifically dedicated to the nuclear program.

The United States only discovered the facility’s construction at the end of 1958, through U-2 aerial surveillance. In December 1960, the news was published by the New York Times and London’s Daily Express.

The American administration then launched efforts to verify the situation at Dimona. American inspectors were repeatedly deceived about the true military nature of the facility, and eventually abandoned their mission, stating that Israel’s lack of cooperation made further inspections entirely pointless.

With General de Gaulle’s rise to power, the Franco-Israeli collaboration effectively came to an end. Throughout the 1960s, there were multiple efforts aimed at procuring — by legal or illegal means — the materials needed to fuel the facility.

The story of how Israel secured the materials needed for nuclear weapons construction, developed delivery systems, and built management facilities is highly complex.

Uranium was obtained from the most varied sources: Argentina, Gabon, the Congo (the “Operation Plumbat,” described in detail by T. Zoellner in Uranium, Penguin Books, 2009), South Africa, and naturally the United States (G.T. Seaborg, E. Seaborg, Adventures in the Atomic Age: From Watts to Washington, New York, 2001).

It is a history of subterfuge and serious violations of international law, at times bordering on catastrophe — as happened during the Yom Kippur War, when General Dayan proposed considering the use of 13 nuclear warheads of 20 kilotons each, but was stopped at the last minute by a wise Golda Meir (A. Cohen, When Israel Stepped Back from the Brink, New York Times, October 3, 2013).

We will not delve here into the “Vela Incident”, named after the American satellite that detected a clandestine nuclear test conducted jointly by Israel and apartheid South Africa in September 1979 (Jeffrey Richelson, The Vela Incident, National Security Archive, May 2006).

Nor will we get into the details of the “Vanunu affair”, named after the Israeli who revealed to the Sunday Times of London the state of advancement of Tel Aviv’s nuclear program, with extensive detail and photographs — a disclosure that cost its author a prison sentence for treason, with the risk of the death penalty.

There is, of course, no official accounting of the number or type of nuclear warheads Israel currently possesses. We know that many of them are mounted on Dolphin-class submarines, purchased from Germany since the 1980s. The development of missile technology has otherwise produced delivery systems of the Jericho class.

Current estimates vary significantly: from a limited count of 80–120 warheads — generally cited by those who wish to soften the public’s alarm — to an estimate of over 400 devices (including nuclear artillery shells and neutron bombs), derived by extrapolating from the original estimate made by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in a 2014 Time magazine interview, in which he placed the number of nuclear bombs produced in Israeli laboratories at roughly 300. It is reasonable to assume that the former U.S. president had reliable and exclusive sources of information. Moreover, as early as 1986, analysis of photos of the Dimona facility released by M. Vanunu allowed for an estimate of approximately 40 kg of processed material produced annually by Israel (S. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, Random House, New York, 1991).

The doctrine of “nuclear ambiguity” — neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear weapons — remains a principle of Israeli state behavior to this day. Its specific nuclear doctrine is, of course, unknown.

This state of affairs has elicited very different reactions from successive U.S. administrations, from the Eisenhower presidency’s open hostility toward the American Zionist Council (AZC), to JFK’s critical stance. In the spring of 1963, following an exchange of letters with Ben Gurion, John Kennedy managed to impose periodic inspections of the Dimona nuclear site, while the president’s brother, Robert Kennedy, supported applying tight restrictions to Israeli lobbying activities through enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

Naturally, following the assassination of the two Kennedy brothers, various commentators — with differing levels of credibility — have sought to detect the shadow of Israeli intelligence services (see the various publications of Laurent Guyénot) behind the people who executed the crimes. However, this is an extremely sensitive subject that deserves a separate examination.

Map of Israeli launch bases, including nuclear weapons storage sites

The story of Israel’s nuclear arsenal is one built on subterfuge, lies, crimes, unlikely alliances, and cross-cutting complicity — systematically outside and in violation of the international rules that aimed to curb and regulate the nuclear arms race during the Cold War. It closely resembles the creation of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which was created to counterbalance India’s nuclear power. There is one fundamental difference, however: the absence, among the states in the same geopolitical region, of adversaries of comparable military stature.

The recent aggression against Iran, carried out with active U.S. participation, has made Israel’s primary objective clear: to maintain the region’s nuclear imbalance to its own exclusive advantage.

In essence, the goal is to subject all of its neighboring states to nuclear blackmail, to the threat of total atomic annihilation.

This gross imbalance of military power has triggered, as was entirely foreseeable, a catastrophic outcome. The government and large segments of Israeli society and its institutions have plunged into a “delusion of omnipotence,” a kind of mass neurosis that is leading institutions, the army, and society as a whole to regard as worthless the rules of civilized coexistence, respect for basic human rights, and the protection of civilian life and liberty. It has also fueled a drive for territorial expansion through the invasion and erasure of existing settlements.

A sort of malignant alignment of elements — a far-right, quasi-fascist government; a fundamentalist religious ideology; the complicity of the American ruling class; the extreme weakness of European governments and institutions; and the weakness and systematic ambiguity of Arab world governments — has created the environment that has enabled this epoch-defining rupture.

It is worth asking how could anyone have expected that a state with nuclear capability surpassing that of France or Britain, capable of striking cities and countries within a radius of 3,000 miles, yet with a territory smaller than Tuscany, would not wield its acquired supremacy? Yet this remains a delusion all the same. A strategy of permanent war, underwritten by awareness of one’s own nuclear superiority, is inevitably destined to fail. This delusion led Israel to convince the United States that the Iranian regime would fall within a short time — a grave miscalculation, with tragic consequences.

The United States has found itself, on the basis of faulty predictions, trapped in an unwanted war, and facing the risk of increasingly narrowing the already thin space between the fierce antisemitism of the American right and the growing anti-Zionism of left-wing opinion.

The war has brought further dramatic consequences for Israel: Iran’s retaliatory strikes have struck the vast majority of U.S. military bases in the territories of “friendly” Arab states, convincing the leadership in those states of the ineffectiveness of American “protection”.

It is not unrealistic to suppose that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt have long placed the acquisition of their own independent nuclear arsenals on their military agendas. Israel thus risks finding itself surrounded by states that, regardless of U.S. approval, restore a balance of nuclear deterrence — causing Israel to lose its strategic invulnerability and supremacy.

Finally, Tel Aviv’s delusion of omnipotence — born in large part from the curse of exclusively possessing nuclear weapons — has multiplied armed conflicts with the Arab world while deepening Israel’s complete international isolation. This pushes the sense of danger and insecurity felt by Israel’s own inhabitants to the extreme.

The country’s demographic decline, compounded by the departure of growing numbers of people fleeing insecurity, violence, and international condemnation, cannot fail to produce deep economic crises and institutional collapse. A state with 400 nuclear warheads and fewer than 5 million inhabitants is not sustainable.

The absence of any serious analysis in the political debate of how to avoid a catastrophic outcome to the Middle Eastern crisis and to the existential risk facing the State of Israel is striking. Many pin their hopes for a de-escalation and resolution of the crisis on the “peacemaking” intentions of the Trump administration and its MAGA ideology. Anything is possible. But in this case, that amounts to believing that the solution to the problem is the problem itself.

Cover image: The Dimona nuclear facility (Israel)

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Israel. The Curse of the Nuclear Weapon ultima modifica: 2026-06-03T19:15:37+02:00 da ENRICO CARONE
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